No. 26

The essential style of the natural experience <and the question whether the universal causality needs to be included therein>[[1]](#footnote-1)

<a) Universal considerations on the method of the essential style of natural experience>

We can, starting out from examples[[2]](#footnote-2) of actual or imagined experience, at first „picture“ in a quite optional way the one-sidedly given thing or the quasi-given thing towards the sides that are not given - towards the sides that are invisible in the current experience, but <we can>, insofar as we imagine it as something that has been indeterminately how long, and lasting into the present, also <picture> the inexperienced sides in every phase of this past, and again likewise with regard to the open future, to the phases of the future duration. We can do that in such a way that we freely fantasize in the disorder, or else in such a way that we produce a system of harmony, and this then means according to the sense of the fantasizing, a system of possible univocally matching experiences of one and the same, presenting itself in univocal connections of aspects.[[3]](#footnote-3) This results for example first in a univocal unitary trait of possible experiences of our examplary thing, then ever new such traits, which are all again unitarily connected with one another though, belong to an ideally self-contained universal system, in such a way that every apperception of every such trait is conncetable into every [apperception] of every else [trait] simply through such a trait, which, for its part, also belongs into the universal system. What our subjective acting has to be like that is necessary in order to experience such traits and gain them as belonging together in the unity of an experience [305], how we have to comport ourselves there, moving eyes and arms, looking, touching, coming closer and going into a distance, etc., is not in the line of description. By our devoting ourselves to the thing in an experiencing way and to the options of univocal experience in a system, we need to necessarily perform in the fantasy as well the respective acting in the typical and changing shapes that demands the creation of the univocal experience in its experiential evidence. But it remains anonymous in the performance of such an ont<ic> attitude that is straightforwardly directed towards the experienced.

If we deal with a system that has been produced in such a way, certainly only produced and producible in the open and-so-forth as a multiply open-endless system,examplary and as a pure option, then we can gain its essential style in its free variation and thereby the necessary form of a universal univocal experience, of a universal system of aspects of one and the same thing, and then likewise of a coexisting multiplicity of a thing - eventually of a nature.[[4]](#footnote-4) In a certain way we do not bind ourselves or ignore bindings that are present in the example. At least we can ignore them voluntarily. We do not think of the real bindings of causal dependencies of objective circumstances here, and thereby [we do] only [think of] that, which is predelineated in the way of causal anticipation to the course of possible experiences.

This implies the following: Experience always anticipates as an apperception. If anticipations always play along as well, they are not necessary in their determinateness. Certainly <they are>, if the processes of experiences, or rather, of the apperceptions of a thing and those of other subjective things, proceeding in the same unitary consciousness of time, are in a certain way de facto ordered or imagined in a correspondingly ordered way, namely in such a way that repeatedly the same thing is experienced under ever again similar or equal circumstances (<with> the other things in these and those equal contents of change), then [306] the corresponding being thus and changing of the former thing according to that, which has not yet been experienced, but also according to that, which has been and belongs to it in the meantime, will have to be predelineated correspondingly, in every new case on the basis of repetition as effectiveness of a former circumstantial experience. Thus there is an anticipating binding in the systematic series of apperceptions and their unitary sense. But we may, as has been said, ignore it. We can always, despite it, fantasize other processes within the harmony, which obviously implies the option that the anticipated still was not, that the anticipated will not emerge, that it will be different than expected, and demanded by the former experience. <That> which is posited as well in the way of anticipation of something known of invisible sides and sides that have been invisible may be thought as changed on the same grounds. Of course no thing experience and no harmony of the experience and thereby no certainty of the existence, keeping itself, is possible thereby without constant anticipation of something that cannot be seen, [that is] properly inexperienced, through something experienced: of the backsides by the front sides, etc. But no binding is necessary according to its determinate shape or according to any binding, thought into the indeterminacy of the experiential structure that necessarily remains, according to that, which determines it, we are free in possible experience.

If we consider more concisely then we need to say: Every single experience is binding, it is a belief, but a belief, anticipating beyond some self-given thing, but in a certainty, encompassing the anticipated as well. Every unitary trait of concordant experiences is a unity of binding, a unity of the encompassing total belief, founded in all single experiences and their belief, unifying all bindings. And a certain unity of the binding then stretches over the whole system of harmony, already from the single experience, and then from every current experiential trait, but not without further ado as a full binding. Namely from the actual experience, or rather, from the actual experiential trait with its actual certainty of unity, many kinds of endless systems of concordant experiences and unitary traits [307] need to be freely imagined. But if it is supposed to be a being thing then we are bound by the style of harmony in the possible experiences and connections of experience, that have to be considered, radiating from the current experience. Or rather: Since the belief in experience posits existence as a certainty and thereby presumes co-existence for the unexperienced from the posited into the infinite, then every picturing to oneself the possibilities has the character of constructing one of the hypothetically possible ways of experience and givennesses of experience that would determine the empty content of anticipation, the open sense of the inexperienced. To design the idea of a total system and then the idea of all possible total systems of possible experiences, this means: to design the universe of the total systems of hypothetical options that have to exist if the experienced existence shall actually be, shall actually be able to be the object of possible experience. By its exhibiting the style of such an examplary system and in quite <a> free variation the style of something like that as such, the essential consideration procures us with the cognition of the pure form of all bindings that have to be unified by some actual experience, that are always „contingent“ in the fact, always presumptions that have to be disappointed, but still bound to a style in infinity, if a universal experience shall be conceivable, in which the posited existence of experience perseveres consequently.

The free choice with which we may direct the process of a trait of the univocal experience at every place of the system from the same real thing to new options, corresponds to the option to consider every anticipation, performed at the respective place of experience in this sense in a determinate way, in this connection of experience, motivated in this determinateness, that is, <every> anticipating binding as hurt in such a way that the object proves itself to be different „in truth“, is experienced as another one afterwards than he was meant. If this is taken into regard, then it is easily possible to now also imagine systems of experiences of one and the same that do not procede in constant harmony, but ever again in the style of a harmony with occasional disappointments, a becoming inconsistent, always producing a universal harmony though through following „correction“. We only need to consider the case in such a way that if the existence of that, which [308] shall suffice as experienced from the beginning, all the changes with all the possible corrections stand under the idea of a lasting true being and being thus, that is, imply at the same time the idea of a completely univocal system of possible experience, free from corrections, towards which the systems of correction converge. Correspondingly this needs to eventually be performed for the universal unity of nature as a totality of being.

If we exhibit the essential style of natural experience in this method, insofar as we consider it and shall be able to consider it as an experience of being things and as a total experience of a being nature, then this, as we may also say, has the sense to exhibit that, which is implied as unconditional necessities of the style of possible experience in the „general thesis“ of nature (and a general thesis as such, in which a being world is given to an experiencing subjectivity), and to simply show that the universal actual experience, however it procedes, is built up from mere contingencies, but contingencies that are object to the laws of absolute necessity according to the style of their sense-giving and synthesis.

This leads to a question as continuation of this investigating the essential style of a universal experience: In how far is such an experience, of which we thus presuppose that it is as an experience of a nature, not only given as being, but rather consequently implying in truth (corresponding to the general thesis) able to determine the being? A universal experience, our single subjective and intersubjective one, going through our lives, can never produce in itself the whole system of harmony throughout our lives, <that is> from essential reasons. My individual universal experience, that of my whole life, best functioning of the memory *ideally* presupposed, is only a trait of unity. I could have experienced otherwise at every point, I could have turned my head otherwise, I could have looked sideways instead of straight on, towards the left instead of the right, etc. I therefore have only gained a one-sided total aspect of the world so far, and I will never gain anything else. And I know myself in the intersubjectivity, in which everyone has his world aspect. On the other hand, my world experience does not only imply quite indeterminate co-opinions, only of a universal essential style since it [309] has to be constructed according to its essential form. However incompletely determined the world may remain - purely within the experience and according to its respective concrete sense -, it still has a rich content of determination, that is, a content of anticipation, having its ways of possible verifyability and of the possible annulment through new experiences and their anticipations.

It is also part of the the essential description of the style of universal experience in the progressing (and verifying itself as anticipation) general thesis to exhibit the whole sense of being of the experiencing nature according to its structure that is possible in detail and necessary as a form of style in the wole, and to show *in forma* what is implied in the sense of the experienced nature as such (and not of any „thinking“ following afterwards like that of objective science) as a constantly constituted and constantly to be verified and to be falsified purely in the experience, which kind of determination and possible indeterminacy.

<b) The question, whether the objectivation of a universal causality necessarily belongs to the essential style of the experience>

It is obvious in this regard that indeed dependencies of the experienced real thing of real circumstances, of the being thus here from the being thus there, that is, causalities, belong to the universal and also necessary style of a world experience. Or, which is only another expression, a universal total experience, thereby consisting of single traits in breaks of the sleep, etc., needs to receive sense determinations through the induction of the similar under similar circumstances.[[5]](#footnote-5)

[310] On the other hand though it is not at all part of their essential style that every determinate being thus is univocally determined by, dependent on causal circumstances, at the very most that each could be it, which may be though an empty option. We cannot perform deductions for the world of experience according to the kind of Kant‘s analogies. It is implied in their style that some thing is determined and some open in the world, some thing „causally“ dependent and determined by objective circumstances and some contingent. Contingency does not designate any unknown causality here but an entering that is simply not motivated by the circumstances. Certainly there is an endless horizon of the unknown; and if something new is known of it, then this can emerge to be as some determinately motivating circumstance of that, which is considered contigent. But this is an empty option for the time being.

That, which is determinately anticipated in the objectivities of experience, is motivated according to the essence of experience by other kinds of and present experience, it thus has its reason. Such empirically ass<ociated> motivations can certainly be annulled by new ones; but as long as they are not, as long as we do not have a motive at hand, they are accepted and have their evidence in the experience and in the experiencing recurrence to the motives. But everything that is conceivable, that [is] possible but not motivated simply is accepted as an empty, an ungrounded option. There where causality is meant, it has, whether a strong or a weak, an immediately obvious or from a distant analogy, motive that is even then not gained quite without a reason, and then a direction towards causal circumstances that are of a determinate character.[[6]](#footnote-6) But where a becoming sets in without a motivated relation to circumstances, there it has the character of the contingent in the experience. Only if it might be shown in the total course of experience that something contingent „ever again“ turns out to be something causally conditioned, and now a universal presumption of the sense accrues to every givenness of experience as such, it may become different. But the fact that it accrues is no part of the necessity of a universal experience, and it is therefore no wonder that the everyday man does not know anything of a universal causal law.

[311] But against this we need to object:[[7]](#footnote-7) The being sense of the experiential world de facto is a constantly changeable one, that is, not only in detail, but, as has just emerged from the latter consideration, also with regard to the universal sense structure, insofar as we indeed see that it only had to take on the sense of a world with unconditionally universal causality. But we need to take into consideration that the universal sense of the world with regard to the inner and outer infinity of possible experience and thereby the idea of a true world, a world, the way it is itself, and presents itself in the infinity (the presupposed) of close things and distant things, is an ex post facto acquisition.

The world of „natural experience“ does not know any idealizations, it does not know (or knows if we only take up the necessary into this concept of natural experience) any infinities, and thereby that, which through infinities constitutes itself in the sense. The natural world is the practical world, according to which indeed the true of the one may be a mere appearance for the truth of the other in the change of the practical interests and the things relatively „true“ to them, and thus ever again needs to be, if the different interests belong to different close steps.[[8]](#footnote-8) But that an ever-again in the ideal sense is possible, and [that] we need to assume a true world lying in the infinite in the theoretical interest, this is something new.

The natural world simply is opposite to the world of the theoretical interest, the natural man stuck to the finite, the scientific, the philosophical man living in the infinities he conceives in an idealizing way. The natural experience has its essential structure in the consequent harmony. It has as an essential property that it has implied an open infinity, insofar as its respective last [thing] is contingent. We can essentially conceive of the game of [312] closeness and distance iterated in an evident shape, and give to their consequence the sense of an endless consequence, but thus not only externally (external infinity), but also inwardly. An empirical motivation somehow even speaks in favor of this, insofar as the experience slowly also actualizes ever new inner approaches, that make expect ever new ones (by new means).

Thus the possibility of forming ideas, and of the idea of a true world (in itself) lying in the infinite, is inherent, pre-grounded in the natural experience in this way. This conceded, the question is now, whether this idea of a world that is true in itself does not in advance and essentially demand the strict universal causality as the consequence‘s structural necessity.

1. Summer term 1926. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. An example of any thing. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Involuntarily we remain at that - I, the one seeking the method - at first on the world‘s layer, <in the > nature (*physis*) and thereby again in the circle of our primordiality. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. But here it becomes questionable. And even <with regard to> the concrete world. The considering is lacking, what is the relation of the problem of the essential form of single real things to the problem of the world‘s essential form, and also the limitation on nature is to be grounded and problematic. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. A confounding is implied here! Like at the beginning. The universal apperception with its apperceptions of single real things has its universal style in the change and every special apperception then [has] its special style. The universal style of possible experiences (that may be constructed (in) advance) as experiences that univocally go together towards the constant acceptance of experience of a real thing and then of a whole world, that is the aesthetically subjective connection of „motivation“, in which reality and world together with their real connections „constitute“ themselves „aesthetically“ as a unity of acceptance. The ont<ological> referring to an experience-process from an experience-process. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Failed. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The constituted, experienced world, and its world connection are different than the connections of the mental processes of experiencing, or rather, of the immanent ways of consciousness, in which experienced real and real universe become conscious. And therefore the onta of the surrounding world are separated, which become „appearances“ themselves, from the true onta in relativity and eventually ideality, the noetic from the noematic - and this difference itself becomes ambiguous. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This is oblique in this context. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)